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I. INTRODUCTION
The decision in Marchetto v. DeKalb Genetics Corp. (Marchetto)'
binds individuals and corporations to an international arbitration agreement
reaching far beyond their intent. In Marchetto, the Illinois district court
held that claims of breach of, and tortious interference with a shareholder
agreement, by nonparties to the shareholder agreement, are arbitrable
pursuant to the arbitration clause in the shareholder agreement. 2  The
Marchetto decision allowed the defendants, who did not sign the
shareholder agreement containing the arbitration clause, to avoid litigation
because they were intertwined in the dispute between the parties who did
sign the shareholder agreement and were subject to the arbitration clause.
The Illinois district court dismissed the action brought by the Marchettos
against four defendants, one with whom they had signed a shareholder
agreement containing an arbitration clause, and three with whom they had
not signed an agreement.3 The district court then ordered arbitration as to
all of the parties. The court reasoned that the arbitration clause was
broad enough to include all shareholder disputes, despite the fact that the
claims were brought against three parties who did not sign the shareholder
agreement containing the arbitration clause!
First, this Comment reviews the background of pertinent federal
substantive law, including the Federal Arbitration Act and the United
Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign
Arbitral Awards. Second, it outlines the application of this federal law to
international arbitration agreements. This Comment then discusses the
enforceability of international arbitration agreements pursuant to federal
substantive law and reviews the court's analysis and application of the
pertinent federal law in Marchetto. Finally, this Comment reveals how
the court misconstrued and misapplied relevant law so as to enforce an
1. 711 F. Supp. 936 (N.D. 111. 1989).
2. Id. at 939.
3. Id.
4. Id. at 941.
5. Id. at 939-40.
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arbitration clause against corporations that did not sign the shareholder
agreement containing the arbitration clause and therefore, should not have
been bound by that arbitration clause.
II. BACKGROUND
At common law, judicial hostility toward binding arbitration
prevailed, thereby hindering a strong reliance on arbitration clauses in the
business world. 6 It was not until Congress' enactment of the Federal
Arbitration Act (Arbitration Act) in 1925 7 that United States federal
policy began favoring arbitration clauses.! The Arbitration Act began a
trend in the United States toward enforcement of arbitration clauses.9
Congress passed the Arbitration Act in order to avoid "the costliness and
delays of litigation, and to place arbitration agreements upon the same
footing as other contracts...."" In section 2, the Arbitration Act declares
that a written arbitration agreement is "valid, irrevocable and enforceable"
in "maritime transactions" or in a "contract involving commerce." The
Arbitration Act primarily governs domestic agreements, although it also
applies to international agreements if they fall within the above
restrictions." The willingness of courts to enforce domestic arbitration
agreements pursuant to the passage of the Arbitration Act built the
foundation for recognition and enforcement by the courts of international
arbitration agreements. International arbitration agreements were further
facilitated by United States participation in the United Nations Convention
on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (the
Convention) on June 10, 1958.12 This eventually led to the passage of
6. Lessing, Sauer-Getriebe KG v. White Hydraulics, Inc.: Applicability of the Federal
Arbitration Act to International Commercial Arbitration, 2 INT'L TAX & BUs. L. 331
(1984).
7. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-208 (1988).
8. Sturges & Murphy, Some Confitsing Matters Relating to Arbitration under the United
States Arbitration Act, 17 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 580 (1932); H.R. REP. No. 96, 68th
Cong., 1st Sess., pt.1, at 2 (1924).
9. See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 629-
31 (1984); Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1 (1983);
Snyder v. Smith, 736 F.2d 409, 417 (7th Cir. 1984); In re Oil Spill by Amoco Cadiz, 659
F.2d 789, 795 (7th Cir. 1981); Zell v. Jacoby-Bender, Inc., 542 F.2d 34, 37 (7th Cir.
1976); Stein & Wotman, International Commercial Arbitration in the 1980s: A Comparison
of the Major Arbitral Systems and Rules, 38 Bus. LAw. 1685 (1983).
10. Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 511 (1974), (quoting H.R. REP. No.
96, 68th Cong., Ist Sess. 1-2); see also S. REP. No. 536, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. (1924).
See generally Healy, An Introduction to the Federal Arbitration Act, 13 J. MAR. L. & COM.
223 (1982).
11. Lessing, supra note 6, at 331.
12. 9 U.S.C. § 2; The United States, however, did not ratify the Convention until
1970. See Quigley, Accession by the United States to the United Nations Convention on the
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 70 YALE L.J. 1049 (1961).
[Vol. 6:2 1991]
ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN ARBITRAL AWARDS
enabling legislation in 1976 that became the second chapter to the
Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. sections 201-208.1
III. APPLICABILITY OF THE CONVENTION
The Convention states that "an arbitration agreement ... arising out
of a legal relationship, whether contractual or not, which is considered as
commercial, including a transaction, contract or agreement described in
section 2 of this title falls under the Convention."14 To determine what
agreements meet these definitions, four preliminary inquiries must be
made:
(1) Is there an agreement in writing to arbitrate the subject of the
dispute?'
(2) Does the agreement provide for arbitration in the territory of a
signatory of the Convention?"
(3) Does the agreement arise out of a legal relationship, whether
contractual or not, which is considered commercial?"
(4) Is a party to the agreement not an American citizen, or does the
commercial relationship have some reasonable relation with one
or more foreign states?"
If these inquiries are answered in the affirmative, as governed by
federal substantive law,' 9 the district court, according to Chapter 2 of the
Arbitration Act, must find that the Convention applies and order
arbitration.? Once the Convention is found to apply, the only permissible
reason for not ordering arbitration is a finding that the agreement is "null
and void, inoperative or incapable of being performed. "21 Moreover,
Chapter 1, as well as Chapter 2, of the Arbitration Act state that
13. See generally Aksen, American Arbitration Arrives in the Age of Aquarius, United
States Implements United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign
Arbitral Awards, 3 Sw. U.L. REV. 1 (1971); Donke, The United States' Implementation of
the United Nations' Arbitration Convention, 19 AM. J. COMP. L. 575 (1971); McMahon,
Implementation of the United Nations Convention on Foreign Arbitral Awards in the United
States, 2 J. MAR. L. & COM. 735 (1971).
14. Lessing, supra note 6, at 331.
15. UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE RECOGNITION & ENFORCEMENT OF
FOREIGN ARBITRAL AWARDS, article 11(l), 11(2) [hereinafter Convention].
16. Convention, articles I(l), 1(3); 9 U.S.C. § 206; Declaration of the United States
upon accession, reprinted in 9 U.S.C. § 154 n.29 (1982 Supp.).
17. Convention, article 1(3); 9 U.S.C. § 202.
18. 9 U.S.C. § 202; 21 U.S.T. 2517 (1958), T.I.A.S. No. 6997, 330 U.N.T.S. 38.
See generally A.J. Vandenberg, THE NEW YORK ARBITRATION CONVENTION OF 1958
(1981); G. Gaja, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION: NEW YORK CONVENTION
(1978).
19. Ledee v. Ceramiche Ragno, 684 F.2d 184, 186-87 (1st Cir. 1982).
20. 9 U.S.C. §§ 201-2, 206 (1988).
21. Ledee, 684 F.2d 184, 187 (Ist Cir. 1982).
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arbitration clauses "shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon
such grounds as exist at law or equity for the revocation of any
contract. "22 These two chapters of the Arbitration Act indicate a
presumption in federal law in favor of ordering arbitration.
3
Despite the application of the Arbitration Act, some domestic
arbitration agreements are not enforced because they are contrary to
public policy.u However, in the international arena, public policy
considerations rarely affect the application of the Convention. 25 On the
contrary, the courts state that any doubts regarding the validity or scope
of an arbitration clause must be resolved in favor of arbitration and
"with special force in the area of international commerce. "27 This policy
divests district courts of a significant amount of discretion in determining
whether to order arbitration. 28 District courts may refuse to order
22. 9 U.S.C. §§ 2, 206; Convention, art. II § 3; Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v.
Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983); Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S.
506, 520 (1974); Prima Paint Co. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395 (1967).
23. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Co., 460 U.S. 1, 24-5
(1983); Snyder v. Smith, 736 F.2d 409, 417 (7th Cir. 1984); In re Oil Spill by Amoco
Cadiz, 659 F.2d 789, 795 (7th Cir. 1981); Marchetto v. DeKalb Genetics Corp., 711 F.
Supp. 936, 938 (N.D. Ill. 1989) (citing Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-
Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 625 (1984)).
24. Convention, art. V (2)(b); See Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express,
Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989); Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953) (claim arising out of
Security Act of 1933 not subject to arbitration; limited to barring waiver of judicial forum
where arbitration is inadequate to protect substantive rights at issue); American Safety
Equipment Corp. v. J.P. Maguire & Co., 391 F.2d 821 (2d Cir. 1968) (holding domestic
antitrust transactions are not subject to Federal Arbitration Act) (Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v.
Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1984)); Pitofsky, Arbitration and Antitrust
Enforcement, 44 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1072 (1969); Aksen, Arbitration and Antitrust-Are They
Compatible? 44 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1097 (1969); Sterk, Enforceability of Agreements to
Arbitrate; An Examination of the Public Policy Defense, 2 CARDOZo L. REv. 481 (1981);
Note, Antitrust and Arbitration in International Commerce, 17 HARV. INT'L L.J. I 11 (1976).
25. See Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984); Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co.,
417 U.S. 506 (1974).
Concerns of international comity, respect for the capacities of foreign and
transnational tribunals, and sensitivity to the need of the international
commercial system for predictability in the resolution of disputes, all
require enforcement of the arbitration clause in question, even assuming
that a contrary result would be forthcoming in a domestic context.
Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 615 (1984).
26. Mitsubishi Motors Corp., 473 U.S. 614, 626 (1984); Steel Workers v. Warrior &
Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); City of Meridian, Miss. v. Algernon Blair, Inc.,
721 F.2d 525, 527 (5th Cir. 1983); In re Oil Spill by Amoco Cadiz, 659 F.2d 789, 795 (7th
Cir. 1981); Dickinson v. Heinold Securities, Inc., 661 F.2d 638, 643 (7th Cir. 1981).
27. Mitsubishi Motors Corp., 473 U.S. 614, 629-31 (1984); Scherk v. Alberto-Culver
Co., 417 U.S. 506, 516-17 (1974); In re Oil Spill by Amoco Cadiz, 659 F.2d 789, 795 (7th
Cir. 1981); Marchetto v. DeKalb Genetics Co., 711 F. Supp. 936, 938 (N.D. I1l. 1989);
Karlberg European Tanspa, Inc. v. JK-Josef Kratz Vertriebsgesllschaft, 618 F. Supp. 344,
347 (N.D. I1l. 1985).
28. See Mitsubishi Motors Corp., 473 U.S. 614 (1984); Scherk, 417 U.S. 506 (1974);
In re Oil Spill by Amoco Cadiz, 659 F.2d 789 (7th Cir. 1981); Parsons & Whittemore
Overseas Co. v. Societe Generale de L'Industrie du Papier, 508 F.2d 969, 973-74 (2d Cir.
1974).
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arbitration only after finding that an agreement is "null and void,
inoperable or incapable of performance,"9 and such a finding must be
based on factors that can be applied neutrally on an international scale,3"
such as fraud, mistake, duress, and waiver.3" Thus, there are limited
circumstances under which an arbitration clause is invalid or is not within
the parameters of the Convention.
IV. ENFORCEABILITY OF ARBITRATION
CLAUSES PURSUANT TO THE CONVENTION
Once a court has established that the agreement falls under the
Convention, the court has several means to ensure that the agreement is
enforced. 32 First, the court can stay any action filed within its district that
is based on an issue encompassed within the arbitration clause.Y Second,
the court can compel arbitration if the site for arbitration is within its
districtA Third, the court may order parties to arbitrate -- even outside
the United States.3s
Parties often attempt to avoid the enforcement of an arbitration
clause by arguing that the dispute is not within the scope of the clause,
thereby prohibiting the application of the Convention. The courts,
however, are reluctant to accept such arguments.36 Where the scope of
the clause is at issue, the court is forced to decide if the clause is broad
enough to include the presented dispute.37 The court initially refers to the
language of the clause,3s  and it does so in light of the federal policy
29. Convention, art. 11 (3); 9 U.S.C. § 201.
30. Sedco, Inc. v. Petroleos Mexicanos Mexican Nat'l Oil Co., 767 F.2d 1140, 1144--
45 (5th Cir. 1985); Ledee v. Ceramiche Ragno, 684 F.2d 184, 186-87 (1st Cir. 1982).
31. Convention, art. 11 (3).
32. See I.T.A.D. Associates, Inc. v. Podar Bros., 636 F.2d 75 (4th Cir. 1981).
33. 9 U.S.C. § 3; Ledee, 684 F.2d 184, 187 (1st Cir. 1982).
34. See Sedco v. Petroleos Mexicanos Mexican Nat'l Oil Co., 767 F.2d 1140 (5th Cir.
1985) (quoting Commerce Park at DFW Freeport v. Mardian Constr. Co., 729 F.2d 334,
388 (5th Cir. 1984) (quoting Wick v. Atlantic Marine, Inc., 605 F.2d 166, 168 (5th Cir.
1979))).
35. 9 U.S.C. § 206; Sedco, 767 F.2d 1140, 1146 (5th Cir. 1985).
36. See Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24-
25 (1983); Butler Products Co. v. UnitStrut Corp., 367 F.2d 733, 736 (7th Cir. 1966);
Marchetto v. DeKalb Genetics Corp., 711 F. Supp. 936, 939-40 (N.D. Ill. 1989).
37. See generally Commerce Park at DFW Freeport v. Mardian Constr. Co., 729 F.2d
334, 338 (5th Cir. 1984); Becker Autoradio U.S.A., Inc. v. Becker Autoradiowerk GmbH,
585 F.2d 39 (3rd Cir. 1978).
38. Sedco v. Petroleos Mexicanos Mexican Nat'l Oil Co., 767 F.2d 1140, 1145 (5th
Cir. 1985) (citing Commerce Park at DFW Freeport v. Mardian Constr. Co., 729 F.2d 334,
338 (5th Cir. 1984)).
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encouraging the enforceability of arbitration clauses. 9 This federal policy
leads the courts to construe arbitration clauses broadly4 The court will
only deny the enforcement of a clause if "it can be said with positive
assurance that an arbitration clause [within an agreement] is not
susceptible of an interpretation which would cover the dispute at
issue.... "4' Thus, when any question of fact exists as to the scope of a
clause, the disputed issue will be held subject to the clause and arbitration
will be ordered.4 In fact, one court held that the scope of the arbitration
clause itself is an issue that can be decided in arbitration.'
Another argument often proposed as a defense to enforcement is
that nonparties are intertwined in a dispute between signatory parties to
the arbitration clause and therefore, arbitration cannot proceed.
Generally, one party to the agreement alleges that ordering the signatory
parties to arbitrate while one of the signatory parties continues a court
action with a nonsignatory party prohibits efficient judicial management.'
The courts, however, emphasize that even if piecemeal litigation is the
result of compelling arbitration it is not a basis for refusing arbitration.'
The courts refer to Article II, sections one and three4 of the Convention
39. See 9 U.S.C. §§ 201-2, 206; Mitsubishi Motors Corp. Soler v. Chrysler-Plymouth,
Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1984); Steel Workers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574
(1960); City of Meridian, Miss. v. Algernon Blair Inc., 721 F.2d 525, 527 (5th Cir. 1983);
In re Oil Spill by Amoco Cadiz, 659 F.2d 789, 795 (7th Cir. 1981); Dickinson v. Heinold
Securities, Inc., 661 F.2d 638, 643 (7th Cir. 1981).
[Qluestions of arbitrability must be addressed with a healthy regard for the
federal policy favoring arbitration.... The Arbitration Act establishes that,
as a matter of federal law, any doubts concerning the scope of the
arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration, whether the
problem at hand is the construction of the contract language itself or an
allegation of waiver, delay, or a like defense to arbitrability.
Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1983).
40. Wick v. Atlantic Marine, Inc., 605 F.2d 166, 168 (5th Cir. 1979).
41. Commerce Park at DFW Freeport v. Mardian Constr. Co., 729 F.2d 334, 338 (5th
Cir. 1984).
42. 9 U.S.C. § 3.
43. See Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp., 460 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1983); Marchetto v.
DeKalb Genetics Co., 711 F. Supp. 936, 939-40; Lessing, supra note 6, at 331.
44. 9 U.S.C. § 206.
45. See Dean Whitter Reynolds v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 221-22 (1985); Moses H. Cone
Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Co., 460 U.S. 1, 19 (1983); Sedco v. Petroleos
Mexicanos Mexican Nat'l Oil Co., 767 F.2d 1140, 1147 (5th Cir. 1985); C. Itoh & Co. v.
Jordan Int'l Co., 552 F.2d 1228, 1232 (7th Cir. 1977).
46. Convention, art. II(1) states that:
Each Contracting State shall recognize an agreement in writing under
which the parties undertake to submit to arbitration all or any differences
which have arisen or which may arise between them in respect of a
defined legal relationship, whether contractual or not, concerning a subject
matter capable of settlement by arbitration.
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which state that signatory countries shall recognize arbitration clauses and
shall refer parties to arbitration when the previously discussed four criteria
are met. Furthermore, the Arbitration Act, in accordance with Article II,
section three, states that a court "shall on application of one of the parties
stay the trial of the action until such arbitration has been had in
accordance with the terms of the agreement.... "4' The clear language of
the Convention and the Arbitration Act indicates that no judicial discretion
is available once a clause is determined to be valid.4 In such an instance,
compelling arbitration is mandatory.
For example, the court in C. Itoh & Co., Inc. v. Jordan
International Co. stated that "considerations of judicial economy bear no
relation to 'the making and performance of an agreement to arbitrate.'" s
And further, the Supreme Court in Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v.
Mercury Construction Corp. held that "[u]nder the Arbitration Act, an
arbitration agreement must be enforced notwithstanding the presence of
other persons who are parties to the underlying dispute but not to the
arbitration agreement. "5' Essentially, even if the dispute must be settled
in two separate forums, one judicial and one arbitral, arbitration still must
be compelled in order to comply with the Arbitration Act and the
Convention. Thus, an arbitration agreement must be enforced as to its
parties, even if the arbitration proceeding is not able to resolve the entire
dispute between all of the parties.
V. APPLICATION AND ENFORCEMENT
OF THE ARBITRATION ACT:
Marchetto v. DeKalb Genetics Corp.
A. The Facts:
The parties in Marchetto v. DeKalb Genetics Corp. were all
shareholders in DeKalb Italiana S.P.A. (DeKalb Italiana).s3 In 1963,
47. Id. at art. 11(3):
The court of a Contracting State, when seized of an action in a matter in
respect of which the parties have made an agreement within the meaning
of this article, shall, at the request of one of the parties, refer the parties
to arbitration, unless it finds that the said agreement is null and void,
inoperative or incapable of being performed.
48. 9 U.S.C. § 3.
49. Id.
50. 552 F.2d 1228, 1231 (7th Cir.) (citation omitted). Cf. Tai Ping Ins. Co. v. M/N
Warschau, 731 F.2d 1141 (5th Cir. 1984) (holding that intertwined disputes must be
resolved in one forum).
51. 460 U.S. 1, 19 (1983).
52. C. Itoh & Co. v. Jordan Int'l Co., 552 F.2d 1228, 1231-32 (7th Cir. 1977).
53. 711 F. Supp. 936, 937 (N.D. Ill. 1989).
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DeKalb Italiana was formed as a joint venture between DeKalb
Agriculture Association, Inc. (DeKalb Agriculture) and two Italian
citizens, the Marchettos. 4 At the time of the joint venture, each of the
two groups, DeKalb Agriculture and the Marchettos, owned fifty percent
of the outstanding common stock of DeKalb Italiana. The two groups
entered into a shareholders' agreements which prohibited any shareholder
from transferring his shares without the permission of the other
shareholders.5 6 In addition, the agreement gave the other shareholders the
option to purchase the shares. 7  The agreement was later amended to
include a clause subjecting "any shareholder dispute" to arbitration by a
panel of arbitrators in Rome, Italy.s
One of the original parties, DeKalb Agriculture, subsequently
renamed DeKalb Corporation (DeKalb), sold its shares in DeKalb Italiana
on July 15, 1982, to DeKalb-Pfizer Genetics, a partnership between
DeKalb and Pfizer Genetics, Inc."9 DeKalb Agriculture, however, sold its
shares in DeKalb Italiana without the consent of the Marchettos and
without offering them the option to buy the DeKalb Italiana shares. 
6
Following this sale, DeKalb reorganized into three companies: DeKalb
Energy, which is DeKalb's successor corporation, DeKalb Genetics, and
Pride Petroleum Services, Inc. DeKalb Genetics replaced DeKalb in the
DeKalb-Pfizer Genetics partnership. 6' DeKalb Energy, as DeKalb's
successor in interest, was the only defendant in this action which was a
party to the shareholder agreement.
These transactions led to the Marchettos' suit against DeKalb
Genetics Corp., DeKalb Energy, DeKalb-Pfizer Genetics, and Pfizer
Genetics, Inc. The Marchettos claimed: (1) breach of the shareholder's
agreement, and (2) tortious interference with the shareholders'
agreement."
B. The Court's Findings:
The district court began its review of the actions by first outlining
the strong federal policy favoring the enforcement of arbitration
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 938.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.
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agreements.G The district court determined the applicability of the
Convention by making the four necessary inquiries, as previously
discussed." The district court's findings were that:
(1) there was a written agreement;
(2) the agreement provided for arbitration in a signatory country,
namely Italy;
(3) the shareholders' agreement incorporated a legal relationship;
and
(4) the actions in dispute had a reasonable relationship to a foreign
state, Italy. 65
Based on these findings, the district court held that (1) the possibility that
Italian law may divest the arbitrators of jurisdiction to resolve the dispute
was not determinative of an American court's duty to enforce an
otherwise valid arbitration clause pursuant to the Convention, and (2) the
presumption favoring arbitrability prohibited the court from severing the
tortious interference claim as beyond the scope of the arbitration clause,
thus, finding the claim nonarbitrable. 66 These holdings are correct as to
the Marchettos and DeKalb Energy, DeKalb's successor in interest,
therefore making arbitration mandatory pursuant to Article II of the
Convention, sections two and three, and the Arbitration Act, sections
three and four. The author posits, however, that these holdings were
incorrect as to the three defendants who did not sign the shareholders'
agreement containing the arbitration clause.
C. Marchetto's Mistaken Defense to Enforcement
of the Arbitration Agreement
After answering the four operative questions discussed above, the
court stated, "There is no dispute that these factors are present in this
case. Italy is a signatory. country. The shareholder agreement
unquestionably embodies a legal relationship. The arbitration clause was
incorporated into this agreement [and] ... the allegedly unlawful transfers
of DeKalb Italiana stock have a reasonable relationship to Italy."1
7
Conceding that this accurately described the parties' relationship and,
therefore, that the Convention clearly applied, the only means for the
Marchettos to avoid enforcement of their arbitration clause and dismissal
of their judicial action was to claim one of the defenses listed in Article
63. Id.
64. Id. at 939. See supra notes 15-18 and accompanying text.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 939.
67. Id. (citation omitted).
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II, section 3 of the Convention." Thus, the Marchettos alleged that the
arbitration agreement was "incapable of performance" because three of the
four defendants were not parties to the agreement and, thus, Italian law
would divest the arbitrators of jurisdiction to decide the dispute.69
Moreover, under the "incapable of performance" defense, the Marchettos
alleged that the claim for tortious interference was not subject to
arbitration because it went beyond the scope of the arbitration clause.70
As such, any award ordered for this claim would be unenforceable
pursuant to Article V, section l(c) of the Convention.7'
The "incapable of performance" defense, 72 however, has rarely
proven successful and was not successful for the Marchettos. The
Marchettos, by inappropriately conceding that the Convention applied,
were forced to establish a difficult statutory defense. The Marchettos
should have, in the first instance, argued that the Convention did not
apply to DeKalb Genetics Corp., DeKalb-Pfizer Genetics, and Pfizer
Genetics, because they did not sign the shareholder agreement containing
the arbitration clause. 7  Thus, "three of the four defendants [were] not
parties to the agreement [or to the arbitration clause therein]"74 and
therefore, the Convention did not apply according to Article II, section (1)
which states that: "[e]ach Contracting State shall recognize an agreement
in writing under which the parties undertake to submit their disputes to
arbitration... "7s (emphasis supplied).
D. Analysis and Critique
As to the three nonparty defendants, the Marchetto district court
incorrectly answered the first key question: "Is there an agreement in
writing to arbitrate the subject of the dispute?"76  Although there is an
agreement in writing between the Marchettos and DeKalb Energy, the
remaining three corporations were not parties to that writing. Thus, as
68. Convention, art. 11(3) states that: "The court ... shall ... refer the parties to
arbitration, unless it finds that the said agreement is null and void, inoperative or incapable
of being performed."
69. Marchetto v. DeKalb Genetics Corp., 711 F. Supp. 936, 939 (N.D. Iil. 1989).
70. Id.
71. Convention, art.V (1)(c) states that: "(1) Recognition and enforcement of the
award may be refused ... [if] ... (c) The award deals with ... or it contains decisions on
matters beyond the scope of the submission to arbitration...."
72. Convention, art. I (3); 9 U.S.C. §§ 3-4.
73. This is not the same as proving the defense of beyond the scope of the arbitration
clause, which indicates that an arbitration clause exists as to those parties; the question is
merely what issues are encompassed in that clause.
74. Marchetto v. DeKalb Genetics Co., 711 F. Supp. 936, 939 (N.D. I11. 1989).
75. Convention, art. 1I(1).
76. 9 U.S.C § 202.
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between the Marchettos and those corporations, there was no agreement in
writing to arbitrate the dispute. Therefore, the other three key questions
and the defenses listed in the Convention become irrelevant because the
Convention cannot possibly apply.
The court appeared to misunderstand the pertinent federal
substantive law that must be applied in this area and thus, came to an
illogical and untenable conclusion. The court applied the written
agreement made between the Marchettos and DeKalb Energy to the
remaining three nonsignatory defendants. The "[o]bject of the Arbitration
Act is the enforcement of the arbitration agreement made by the parties
themselves in the manner they themselves provide. " 77  Likewise, the
Convention only applies to parties to an arbitration agreement, 7' because
the Convention speaks of enforcement only after it has been determined
that there is an agreement signed by the parties. 79  Furthermore, the
enforcement ability of the courts pursuant to the Convention, Art. 11(2)
and (3) and 9 U.S.C. section 3, extends only to those who have signed an
arbitration clause. Thus, because the arbitration clause had not been
signed by these parties (DeKalb Genetics Corp., DeKalb-Pfizer Genetics,
and Pfizer Genetics Inc.), neither the Convention nor its enforcement
ability applied to them."0
As to DeKalb Energy's motion to dismiss the action and request to
order arbitration, the court's ruling was correct, or at least tenable.
However, the Arbitration Act and the Convention do not apply to any
dispute between persons or entities who have not signed an arbitration
agreement."a Thus, the arbitration agreement should not have been
applied to DeKalb Genetics Corp., DeKalb-Pfizer Genetics, and Pfizer,
Genetics Inc.
The Marchetto district court misconstrued the operative language in
the relevant case law that it cited. The court applied the arbitration clause
to the nonparties because "federal law permits non-parties to an arbitration
agreement to participate in the arbitration proceedings."2 The case law
indicates that an arbitration clause must be enforced between parties
despite the presence of nonparties. However, the case law does not
77. AIS Ganger Rolf v. Zeeland Transp., Ltd., 191 F. Supp. 359, 360 (S.D.N.Y.
1961).
78. Convention, art. 11 (2) and (3).
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. See supra notes 46-48.
82. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24
(1983); Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 520 (1973); Rhone Mediterranee
Compagnia Francese Di Assicurazioni E Riassicurazoni v. Achille Lauro, 712 F.2d 50, 53-
54 (3rd Cir. 1983); Zeil v. Jacoby-Bender, Inc., 542 F.2d 34, 37 (7th Cir. 1976); Marchetto
v. DeKalb Genetics Corp., 711 F. Supp. 936 (N.D. Ill. 1989).
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indicate that nonparties may or shall participate in the arbitration
proceedings. Instead, in Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury
Construction Corp., on which the district court relied sub judice, the
Supreme Court outlined a very different proposition. The Court stated
that an arbitration clause is enforceable as to the parties even if the action
with the nonparty must be held in a separate forum.3 The Supreme Court
did not say the nonparty may or shall participate in the arbitration
proceedings. Rather, the Court stated that the arbitration proceedings
must move forward despite the nonparty's inability to participate. This
implies that resolution of the dispute may require different forums:
judicial, for parties who have not signed an agreement, and arbitral, for
parties who have signed an agreement.
The Marchetto court also relied on C. Itoh & Co., Inc. v. Jordan
International Co.,s4 which enforced an arbitration clause despite the
entanglement of a nonparty in the dispute. The court held that the dispute
between the two parties to the arbitration clause, Itoh and Jordan, was
subject to arbitration. However, the court held that the dispute between
Itoh and Riverview, a nonparty to the arbitration clause, was subject to
the judicial forum. ss This case does not suggest that the nonparty to the
arbitration clause is subject to that clause. Rather, it simply implies that
the nonparty does not undermine the enforcement of the agreement as to
its parties. C. Itoh suggests that the three nonparty defendants in
Marchetto should not hinder arbitration proceedings between Marchetto
and DeKalb Energy. The holding in C. Itoh does not subject the three
nonparty defendants to the arbitration agreement between Marchetto and
DeKalb Energy. Instead, any dispute arising between the three nonparty
defendants and Marchetto should be subject to the judicial forum.
Lastly, in A/S Ganger Rolf v. Zeeland Transp., Ltd., the court
stated that a "complete stranger to an arbitration clause cannot be bound
by any award made against it."16 The court's logic in A/S Ganger Rolf,
suggests that if an arbitral award cannot be enforced on a nonparty, surely
the arbitration clause itself cannot be enforced on the nonparty. The
Marchetto district court, however, held exactly the contrary, giving rise to
totally illogical results. According to the holding in A/S Ganger Rolf, a
nonparty to an arbitration agreement cannot be bound by an arbitration
award made against it; 7 but, according to Marchetto, the nonparty can be
bound by the entire arbitration agreement itself. Such contradictory
results cannot be sustained.
83. Moses H. Cone Memorial HoSp., 460 U.S. 1, 19 (1983).
84. 552 F.2d 1228 (7th Cir. 1977).
85. Id. at 1231-32.
86. 191 F. Supp. 359, 363 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
87. Id.
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E. Reasons for Arbitration
By looking to the underlying reasons for signing arbitration
agreements, it can be suggested that Marchetto is not in line with these
considerations. An enticing reason for entering into arbitration
agreements is that it allows parties to specify important factors affecting
arbitral proceedings.t Thus, arbitration agreements are often preferred to
judicial proceedings, because arbitral proceedings can be fashioned to suit
the parties' own needs. For instance, arbitration permits parties to
appoint the arbitrators who will hear any potential disputes. 9  Also, the
parties to an arbitration agreement decide what substantive rules will
apply, such as the rules of the American Arbitration Association, trade
rules of that particular commercial area, United Nations Commission on
International Trade (UNCITRAL) rules, or others. 90 Finally, the parties'
right of forum selection is arguably the most important. 1 This decision is
paramount because "arbitration proceedings are subject to the national
arbitration laws of the country in which they are held."92 In other words,
the amount of permissible judicial interference is determined by each
forum's rules on arbitration proceedings.n
These are certainly only a few of the underlying reasons why
parties choose to sign arbitration agreements, but they are nonetheless
representative of some of the factors taken into account by each party.
With these factors in mind, it is apparent that the arbitration agreement
between the Marchettos and DeKalb should not apply to the remaining
three defendants. There is no reason to assume that, as between the
Marchettos and DeKalb Genetics Corp., DeKalb-Pfizer Genetics, and
Pfizer Genetics, the same circumstances existed that would have caused
the Marchettos and these defendants to sign exactly the same arbitration
agreement as the one between the Marchettos and DeKalb. As to these
nonsignatory defendants, there may exist reasons why Italy would not be
the forum choice or why other rules of arbitration would be chosen.
Trying to outline the nature of an arbitration agreement between the
Marchettos and these defendants is pure, ad hoc speculation. For this
reason, the court should not have bound these parties to an arbitration
agreement that they did not have the opportunity to fashion to their needs.
88. Higgins, Brown & Rouch, Pitfalls in International Commercial Arbitratior, 35
Bus. LAW. 1035, 1036-37 (1980).
89. Mentschikoff, Commercial Arbitration, 61 COLUM. L. REV. 846, 849 (1961).
90. Note, International Commercial Arbitration: A Comparative Analysis of the U.S.
System and the UNCITRAL Model Law, 12 BROOKLYN J. INT'L L. 703 (1986).
91. Id. at 704.
92. Id. (emphasis added).
93. Park, Arbitration of International Contract Disputes, 39 BUs. LAW. 1783, 1788-89
(1984).
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Unfortunately, the district court's decision binds the Marchettos to
arbitrate with the nonsignatory defendants according to an arbitration
agreement made without these three corporate defendants in mind, and in
fact before these corporate defendants existed. Certainly, that result is
beyond the intended scope of the Arbitration Act, the Convention, and the
parties' intentions.
VI. CONCLUSION
In its zealous desire to enforce the arbitration clause between
Marchetto and DeKalb (subsequently DeKalb Energy), the court failed to
recognize the restriction of the Arbitration Act and the Convention. The
Arbitration Act and the Convention are restricted to disputes arising
between parties to an arbitration agreement. Once the court has
determined that the dispute is in fact between entities who have not signed
an arbitration agreement, the scope of any arbitration clause cannot be
found broad enough to include them. Indeed, there is a presumption in
favor of arbitration,94 but that does not suggest that the court should go
beyond its jurisdictional power to incorporate people or entities who did
not sign the original agreement. The provisions of the Arbitration Act
and the Convention are designed to insure that parties proceed in their
transactions the way they themselves originally fashioned,5 and to unify
the standards by which arbitration agreements are recognized and
enforced.9 Certainly, in molding the agreement that the Marchettos and
DeKalb Agriculture (subsequently DeKalb and then, DeKalb Energy)
eventually signed, the Marchettos did not intend the agreement to direct
its dispute resolution with any party, other than the one with whom it
signed the agreement. Both the district court's and the Marchettos' failure
to accurately consider the application of the Convention to these
circumstances resulted in this untenable decision.
Predictability was the desired outcome from the United States'
accession to the United Nations Convention on the Recognition and
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards. The Illinois district court,
however, by broadening the Convention beyond its intended boundaries,
has injected uncertainty back into the international arbitration arena.
Denise Simmons
94. See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 625
(1985); Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp., 460 U.S. 24-25 (1983); Marchetto v. DeKalb
Genetics Corp., 711 F. Supp 936 (N.D. III. 1989).
95. A/S Ganger Rolf v. Zeeland Transp., Ltd., 191 F. Supp. 359, 390 (S.D.N.Y.
1961).
96. CONVENTION ON THE RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN ARBITRAL
AWARDS, S. EXEC. Doc. E, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968).
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